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What would we say of a medical school where students were taught surgery solely 
from the printed page?  No one, if he could do otherwise, would teach the art of 
playing golf by having the teacher talk about golf to the prospective player and 
having the latter read a book relating to the subject.  The same holds for toe-
dancing, swimming, automobile-driving, hair-cutting, or cooking wild ducks.  Is 
legal practice more simple? 
                                                                                  Jerome Frank
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I.  DEBUNKING THE SO-CALLED THEORY-PRACTICE DIVIDE 
 
 We hear much about the so-called theory-practice divide in legal education.
2
  I 
find this particularly fascinating since no such divide can possibly exist either factually or 
semantically. 
                                                 
*
© Harold Anthony Lloyd 2016. Published in LINDA H. EDWARDS, THE DOCTRINE SKILLS 
DIVIDE: LEGAL EDUCATION’S SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 77-90 (2017).This chapter title 
paraphrases Kant’s famous remark: “Thoughts without contents are empty, intuitions 
without concepts are blind.” IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 45 (F. Max 
Muller trans., Anchor Books 1966)(1781). Kant also says, “Neither of these qualities 
[i.e., concepts vs. intuitions or percepts] is preferable to the other.  Without sensibility 
objects would not be given to us, without understanding they would not be thought by 
us.” Id.   
**
 Associate Professor, Wake Forest University School of Law.  Much of this chapter is 
drawn from my essay, Exercising Common Sense, Exorcising Langdell: The 
Inseparability of Legal Theory, Practice and the Humanities, 49WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
1213 (2014). Additionally, Wake Forest University School of Law recently held a 
detailed symposium on the subject of legal education reform.  See  Revisiting Langdell: 
Legal Education Reform and the Lawyer’s Craft, 51WAKE FOREST L. REV. 231-420 
(2016).  The Wake Forest Law Review plans to publish this symposium edition in book 
form.   
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 In examining the alleged divide, Mark Spiegel provides straightforward 
preliminary definitions of “theory” and “practice” which I shall also adopt for purposes 
of this chapter: 
By “theory” we commonly mean a set of general propositions used as an 
explanation.  Theory has to be sufficiently abstract to be relevant to more than just 
particularized situations.  By “practice” we commonly mean the doing of 
something.  Practice is also associated with the idea of repetition; therefore, 
practice sometimes is equated with the gaining of skills because one gains skills 
by repetition.
3
  
 
 As shown below, any alleged sharp “divide” between “theory” and “practice” is 
an illusory one.  Until we dispel this illusion, we cannot sensibly discuss, much less 
achieve, any proper “balance” of “practice” and “theory” in legal education.  
It is easy to see that a sharp doctrine-skills divide is factually false. Will Rhee sets 
out, among others, four straightforward facts that belie any practice-theory divide: 
First, legal practitioners have authored innovative legal scholarship, the supposed 
bastion of legal theory. Second, legal academics have become renowned legal 
practitioners.  Third, some legal doctrinal concepts currently taken for granted in 
practical lawmaking were first developed or popularized in legal scholarship . . . . 
Finally, practical lawmaking has inspired new legal theory and academic 
scholarship.
4
 
  
It is therefore simply not factually true that any sharp practice-theory divide exists.  
                                                                                                                                                 
PROFESSION OF LAW 5 (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE SUMMARY 2007] (noting that law 
schools are “hybrid institutions” derived from “the historic community of practitioners 
and “the modern research university”); Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal 
Education: An Essay on Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 577, 580 (1987). 
3
 Id..  
4
 Will Rhee, Law and Practice, 9 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JAWLD 273, 280-81 
(2012) (Rhee cites a substantial number of examples to support his point).  An obvious 
example of a legal practitioner who has “authored innovative legal scholarship” would of 
course be Brandeis who introduced the concept of the “Brandeis Brief”; such a brief 
details underlying facts and actual harm to parties where matters of individual rights are 
concerned and “where looking at prior legal rules does not really inform [one] about the 
importance of cases.” See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 219-21 
(2009).  
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Additionally, semantic problems with claims of a sharp theory-practice divide 
exist at both a surface and at a deep level.  At the surface level, the claim is self-defeating 
because theory by definition seeks to explain practice.
5
  To remove practice from theory 
would therefore leave theory empty with nothing to explain.  
To grasp the still-deeper semantic problems with claims of a sharp theory-practice 
divide, we need to understand why the term “meaning” in any useful sense does not 
permit such a divide.  To understand why “meaning” in any such useful sense does not 
permit a sharp practice-theory divide, we need to know what “meaning” means.  
Any workable theory of meaning must involve both sense (the cognitive or mental 
component of meaning) and reference (that to which the term refers as fact or fiction).
6
  
Meaning must have a sense component to account for the different meanings the same 
person, place, or thing may have.  Meaning must also have a reference component to tie 
meaning to the objective world of experience and to tie together the different meanings 
that the same person, place, or thing may have.
7
 For example, sense and reference allow a 
lawyer to refer to the same individual (the reference) as either the “President” or the 
“Commander In Chief” (with the difference of meaning thereby lying in the different 
senses of the terms).
8
 
 In light of the mixed role of sense and reference in meaning, what would be a 
good definition of meaning?  If one understands “experience” to include both external 
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 See Spiegel, supra note 2, at 50.  
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 See WINFRIED NOTH, HANDBOOK OF SEMIOTICS 92-99 (1995). 
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 See id.  
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 See id. 
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experience (i.e., objective or public experience) and internal experience (i.e., private
9
 
experience such as thoughts and memories), the following modified version of Charles 
Saunders Peirce’s pragmatic notion of meaning as a common-sense10 solution works 
well: 
Consider what actual or possible
11
 experiential effects we conceive the object of 
our conception to have.  Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our 
conception of the object.
12
 
 
 This definition of meaning easily squares with how we use “meaning” in 
everyday life, in law school, and in law practice.  If one asks good lawyers what a certain 
statute means, for example, such lawyers would “flesh it out,” would describe how the 
statute would play out in practice.  If one asks good law professors what a fictional 
contract means, they would do the same.  For example, if asked to explain a fictional 
indemnity agreement, a good law professor would include specific scenarios that could 
play out under the terms as written. Thus, if the agreement contained a cap of one 
hundred dollars on the indemnitor’s liability, the explanation would include a statement 
                                                 
9
 By private experience I mean experience private to the individual such as a thought or 
pleasant or painful sensation. 
10
 I use this term both as commonly understood and as recognizing the shared or common 
“sense” of thought and action. 
11
 Again, this can include private experience.  
12
 Peirce’s formula reads: “Consider what effects, which might conceivably have 
practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have.  Then, our 
conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.” CHARLES 
SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 5.402 (Charles 
Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1963). To the extent Peirce’s formula focuses only on 
objective experience and therefore results in beliefs being synonymous if they cause the 
same habits, I would disagree.  See JOHN P. MURPHY, PRAGMATISM FROM PEIRCE TO 
DAVIDSON 25-26 (1990). For example, I could have a habit of walking from my desk to 
the front door in just the same manner whether I believe that the postman is at the door or 
whether I believe that my neighbor is at the door. 
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that in no scenario would the indemnitor be required to pay more than that amount.  If a 
term were vague or ambiguous, the explanation would include tales of how various 
persons might read the term and how such tales might or likely would turn out.  
This common sense notion of “meaning” also fits well within the findings of 
modern cognitive research suggesting that meaning is embodied.  As Lakoff puts it: 
Thought is carried out in the brain by the same neural structures that govern 
vision, action, and emotion.  Language is made meaningful via the sensory-motor 
and emotional systems, which define goals and imagine, recognize, and carry out 
actions.  Now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the evidence is in. . . . 
[that the] mind is embodied.
13
 
 
This embodied approach recognizes that meaning comes “via the sensory-motor 
and emotional systems, which define goals and imagine, recognize, and carry out 
actions.”14  It also recognizes that shortly after we hear or read words, “we engage our 
vision and motor systems to recreate the non-present visions and actions that are 
described.”15  Interestingly, when we perform these recreations, we do not take a purely-
theoretical or “God’s eye” or “canonical” view; instead, “we mentally simulate them 
from the perspective of someone actually experiencing the scene.”16  This involves motor 
simulation which is 
intrinsically about projecting oneself into a body—often someone else’s—and, 
when [one simulates] what it  would be like to do things someone is described as 
doing, [one is] taking their perspective, not merely in a visual way, but in terms of 
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 George Lakoff, Foreward to BENJAMIN K. BERGEN, LOUDER THAN WORDS, at x 
(2012).  
14
 Id.   
15
 Id. at 223. 
16
 Id. at 71; see also GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 132-
133 (2003) [hereinafter METAPHORS WE LIVE BY] (on the “canonical person.”).   
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what it would be like to control their actions.  Understanding language, in 
multimodal ways, is a lot like being there.
17
 
 
Such projections obviously have negative implications for those who would teach law as 
a purely “theoretical” or “canonical” discipline.  Learning law like everything else must 
involve simulations that are “a lot like being there,” i.e., like being in practice. 18   
The existence of abstract concepts does not provide a counter example here.  To 
the extent these simulations involve abstract concepts, we may translate them 
metaphorically into more concrete terms.
19
  For example, “consideration” can become 
concrete when defined as “something of value (such as forty dollars) given in exchange 
for a promise to do something (such as mowing one’s yard).20 
In fact, embodied recreations serve more than just pure semantic purposes. We 
can actually do practice mental recreations to improve performance.
21
  For example, 
bowlers performed better when they visualized proper bowling techniques.
22
  Not 
surprisingly, the reverse also holds true:  when bowlers visualized improper techniques, 
                                                 
17
 Id. at 70. “Being there” does not necessarily always mean conscious simulation.  
Something already done many times may not require simulation before action.  See id. at 
239. See also Harold Anthony Lloyd, Crushing Animals and Crashing Funerals: The 
Semiotics of Free Expression, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 237, 251-52 (2013) (discussing 
the distinction between signs and signals).  
18
 See BERGEN, supra note 13, at 70.  
19
 GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND 
AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 45 (1999)  (1999) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHY 
IN THE FLESH].  
20
 Consistent with this, Frank also notes (unfortunately crudely) that “Abstract theory 
divorced from concrete practical interests is usually dull. Montessori discovered that to 
teach half-witted children arithmetic became easy if they were given practical activities, 
interesting to them, in which adding, subtracting and multiplying were necessary aids to 
the desired specific achievements. They learned by ‘doing.’ If that method is good for 
half-wits, why not for law students (who are presumably whole-wits)?” Frank, supra note 
1, at 1317.  
21
 BERGEN, supra note 13, at 25.  
22
 Id.  
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their actual performance became worse.
23
 Linguists call such knowledge of how to 
interact in practice with an object (whether a bowling ball or a contract) “affordances” of 
that object.
24
      
Such research on improving affordance knowledge (i.e., “knowledge of how to 
interact with an object”) has obvious implications for the law school classroom.  Time in 
class presents an invaluable opportunity for students to blend “theory” with simulation of 
lawyering that will translate into better actual performance.
25
  The bowling research also 
shows how important it is for law professors to get the simulation opportunities right:  
good simulations lead to good results and bad simulations lead to gutter balls instead of 
strikes.
26
  Thus, an understanding of embodied meaning highlights the importance of 
having students see, for example, actual contracts in contract class, actual complaints in 
civil procedure, “video or audio presentations of excellent advocacy,” and of course 
sample exam questions and answers if there is to be an exam.
27
     
To be clear here, my conception of embodied meaning is not that meaning and the 
mind equate to brain and body functions.  This is false on its face.  For example, the 
aromatic cup of coffee that I smell and see twelve inches away from me on my desk 
cannot be in my brain or body.  Things cannot be in two places at once.  Furthermore, the 
sight and smell and any connotations that I associate with them are on their face 
qualitatively different from the cells that make up my brain and sensory systems.  
                                                 
23
 Id.  
24
 See id., at 84.  
25
 See id, at 25.  
26
 Id.    
27
 See Christine N. Coughlin, Lisa T. McElroy & Sandy C. Patrick, See One, Do One, 
Teach One: Dissecting the Use of Medical Education’s Signature Pedagogy in the Law 
School Curriculum, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 361, 379-80 (2010).  
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Additionally, the meaning of “brain” cannot be just the brain since we can have different 
understandings of what brains are and how they work.
28
   
For me, embodied meaning simply means that “the peculiar nature of our bodies 
shapes our very possibilities for conceptualization and categorization.”29  That is, 
embodied meaning depends upon the specific structure of our bodies, including our 
sensory and motor systems.
30
  In other words, “the very properties of concepts are created 
as a result of the way the brain and body are structured and the way they function in 
interpersonal relations and the physical world.”31  For example, if we were “uniform 
stationary spheres floating in some medium and perceiving equally in all directions,” 
what would we mean by front and back or right and left?
32
   
Thus, when meaning is properly understood, legal theory becomes inseparable 
from practice because meaning itself must involve interaction with the world of 
experience.
33
  To give a concrete legal example, we cannot talk about a lease in purely 
theoretical terms.  First, even if for some strange reason we wished to teach leasing 
                                                 
28
 For example, we might think of the brain as a living computer whose processes are 
mathematical calculations or we may think of the brain as some kind of living container.  
See PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 19, at 51, 405.  
29
 Id. at 19.  
30
 See id.  
31
 Id. at 37.  
32
 Id. at 34. Consistent with this, Lakoff and Johnson distinguish between “neural 
embodiment” and “phenomenological embodiment,” (Id. at 36), and address 
phenomenological or cognitively-conscious, cognitively unconscious, and neural levels 
of meaning.
 
 Id. at 102-04, 108-09.  See also id. at 112, 570. All of these various sorts of 
meaning are, again, interactional and are thus inconsistent with disembodied approaches 
that take “two intertwined and inseparable dimensions of all experience—the awareness 
of the experiencing organism and the stable entities and structures it encounters—and 
erects them as separate and distinct entities called subjects and objects.” Id. at 93. 
Embodied meaning, by the way, is not uniquely human.  How our pets and other living 
creatures categorize also “depends upon their sensing apparatus and their ability to move 
themselves and to manipulate objects.” Id. at 17.  
33
 See, e.g., id. at 37. 
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without ever looking at a lease, all of the “theoretical” terms we would use tie back into 
experience and are understood through experience.  If we discuss “rent,” for example, we 
have to say what that means in terms of experience.  This is true even if we merely define 
“rent” as “something paid in exchange for usage of land.”  In addition to how the terms 
“usage” and “land” do or could play out in experience, “something paid” also involves 
the world of experience, albeit at a very imprecise level of description.  Someone 
interested in the subject of leasing would want to know more, would want to know what 
forms this “something paid” actually takes.  Someone interested in the subject of leasing 
would also want to know the possible ways of documenting this obligation to pay 
“something” as rent since that documentation (to the extent it exists) cannot be separated 
as a practical matter from the obligation to pay rent itself.  Again, even if for some reason 
one wished to teach leasing without looking at actual lease provisions such as rent 
provisions, the answer to this documentation question would require descriptions of how 
this documentation might be done in the world of experience.  Thus, there can be no pure 
theory here, only degrees of myopia to the extent hands-on experience is omitted.  Any 
so-called sharp theory-practice divide is therefore a chimera. 
Such blindness of pure theory is of course not unique to law.  One must, for 
example, distinguish between the study of sailing and the mere study of sailboats.  To 
learn to sail, a serious student would not just read books and talk about boats under the 
tutelage of someone who had never sailed a boat.  Who would rationally take charge of a 
sailboat with just such an “education”?  To learn sailing, one must actually sail a boat.  
Again, linguists call such knowledge of how to interact with an object “affordances” of 
10 
 
that object.
34
  Using that terminology, how could someone planning to sail a boat for a 
living afford not to acquire good affordance knowledge of sailing boats in actual water? 
Nothing changes here even if one somehow believes that an education in sailing 
should be “purely theoretical” with the actual practice taught by others after graduation.  
The examination above of the nature of meaning shows that the very “theoretical” 
concepts involved in such a “purely-theoretical” course are inseparable from practice: if 
meaning itself requires us to consider the experiential effects we conceive the object of 
our conception to have, even a so-called “purely-theoretical” concept cannot be divorced 
from experience and thus practice.  Thus, even just studying sailboats as opposed to 
sailing cannot be divorced from practice.  Much like the lease and rent example discussed 
above, one cannot, for example, have a good notion of what “a sail” means without 
having seen and touched one and without having otherwise seen the ways a sail works in 
the actual world.
35
 
 In addition to the errors discussed above, it is also hard to see how any alleged 
divide between theory and practice does not suffer from the same kinds of problems that 
afflict Cartesian dualism.
36
  Descartes believed that mind is an inherently different 
substance from body, with the former essentially involving thought or consciousness and 
                                                 
34
 BERGEN, supra note 13, at 84.  
35
 The art historian, “scientist, or “connoisseur” who is not an artist himself can 
demonstrate this point as well.  For example, in the latter part of the twentieth century, art 
historians determined that a “sculpture” made by three teenagers with a “chisel, a 
screwdriver, and a Black and Decker drill” was an original Modigliani.  Charles Hope, 
The Art of the Phony, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, August 15, 2013, at 51. Though 
“connoisseurs and scientists can often be the forger’s best friends,” one might expect 
better of the affordance knowledge that erudite actual sculptors would bring to reviewing 
works for authenticity. See id. 
36
 See also Harold Anthony Lloyd, Raising the Bar, Razing Langdell, 51 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 240-241 (2016). 
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the latter essentially involving bulk or spatial extension.
37
  Although he believed minds 
and bodies were causally interrelated, he not surprisingly could never clearly explain how 
this worked.
38
  How can dimensionless thought even touch, much less move something 
physical?  The very notion seems to involve a contradiction:  though thought has no 
dimensions it can nonetheless somehow take hold of and move a body?  Gilbert Ryle 
famously mocked this notion with his “ghost in the machine” label—the mind is 
somehow a nonphysical ghost that resides in and operates the body.
39
 
 Any purported theory-practice divide raises similar questions.  If theory is 
essentially different from practice, how can the two interrelate?  How does dimensionless 
theory grab hold of practice?  In a way, this seems even more confusing than the 
Cartesian mind-body problem.  There, at least, the ghost was purportedly in the 
machine—here it is not clear where the ghost could or should reside. 
 Returning to our experiential notion of meaning removes these Cartesian 
quandaries.  Again, if one understands “experience” to include both external experience 
(i.e., objective or public experience) and internal experience (i.e., private experience such 
as thoughts and memories), these problems evaporate.  Both mind and body and theory 
and practice are defined in terms of the same thing:  how they play out in experience.
40
 
                                                 
37
 THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 579 (Ted Honderich, Ed. 1995). 
38
 See id. 
39
 See id. at 312-313. 
40
 The more monistic approach I suggest of course raises its own questions and I lack the 
space to explore them in detail here.  For purposes of this article, suffice it to say that, 
with some caveats, I am generally in sympathy with William James who, as Graham Bird 
puts it, distinguishes “ordinary mental experiences and physical items . . . by the 
contextual relations among pure experiences.”  GRAHAM BIRD, WILLIAM JAMES 120 
(Routledge & Kegan Paul 1986).  As to the first caveat, I would tend to agree with James 
that “purity” of experience here is relative to the “unverbalised sensation it embodies” 
and that adults in ordinary circumstances do not experience such purity. See id. at 99.  I 
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II. BEYOND THE DEBUNKED DIVIDE 
If we reject the alleged theory-practice divide, where does this leave us?  First, we 
should be honest about the kinds of degrees we offer. Like students of sails, students of 
sales (and other areas of the law) need to be clear on their educational goals.  Thus, law 
schools should be clear on the possible multiple meanings of “legal education.”  The 
study of law in its broadest sense includes the study of law as a craft as well as any 
“empirical description” of the law and of what lawyers and judges do.41   Do such 
students wish to study law in this broadest sense or do they simply wish to study 
descriptions of laws and what judges and lawyers do?  If the former, an examination of 
the nature of meaning shows us that this requires hands-on practice.  If the latter, a 
narrower course of study should be recognized as a separate and distinct course of study 
though even here a purely-theoretical approach would be blind for the reasons discussed 
above.
42
  Law schools are beginning to recognize the need for additional degree types and 
are beginning to offer non-J.D. degrees such as Masters of Studies in Law.
43
   
                                                                                                                                                 
would therefore speak in terms of the relations among experiences, not just pure 
experiences. Second, I am sympathetic with James’s belief, as Graham puts it, that 
experience has “a certain character of ‘self-transcendence’ but this is not to make a 
reference to some inexperiencable [sic], independent reality but only to other accessible 
parts of experience itself.”  Id. at 111.  Finally, I am also sympathetic with Peirce’s three 
categories of experience as shedding further light on the nature of experience and the 
various ways it functions. See, for e.g., CHRISTOPHER HOOKWAY, PEIRCE 106 (Routledge 
& Kegan Paul 1985). I hope to explore these lines further some future day. 
41
 See, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 2, at 587-589 (discussing Llewellyn’s division of legal 
theory into (1) “the study of the ends and values involved in law (legal philosophy),” (2) 
“the use of empirical description (legal science),” and (3) “the study of the craft aspects 
of law, such as the machinery of justice and the methods of lawyers and judges 
(jurisprudence).”). 
42
 By study of law, I mean the common notion that one studies to be a lawyer in much the 
same sense as the study of medicine means that one studies to become a doctor. A skills 
component is involved in both.  See  Robert I. Reis, Law Schools Under Siege: The 
Challenge to Enhance Knowledge, Creativity, and Skill Training, 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
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Second, rejecting the divide allows us to see the importance of embracing the 
humanities in legal education, especially by recognizing the ubiquitous roles of metaphor 
in law. Metaphor operates as “understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms 
of another.”44  For example, if we say that Greenacre is a square, we have used metaphor 
by framing Greenacre as a geometric space involving perfect lines, angles and points that 
of course do not exist in the real world.
45
  In fact, we speak metaphorically even if we just 
speak of Greenacre itself, since plots of land that we delineate and our notions of fee 
                                                                                                                                                 
855, 879 (2012)  (discussing the skills component of medical school as well as the skills 
component of schools of dentistry, pharmacology, and architecture and environmental 
design).  See also CARNEGIE SUMMARY 2007, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that “law schools 
could also benefit from the approaches used in education of physicians, teachers, nurses, 
engineers and clergy, as well as from research on learning.”).  
43
 Students may wish to take this course of action, for example, because they believe that 
such an acquaintance with various laws and the way lawyers think and reason will help 
them in their specific jobs. See, e.g., Master of Studies in Law: About the MSL Program, 
WAKE FOREST, http://msl.law.wfu.edu/about/ (last visited July 24, 2013) (describing 
areas where a Masters of Studies in Law degree might be appropriate).  
However, even for these students, the very nature of meaning shows us that a 
good deal of hands-on practice remains required.  Even though they may not wish to 
practice law, non-J.D. students wishing to learn sales laws cannot have a good notion of 
what these laws mean unless they have reviewed documents and hypothetical situations 
to which these laws apply. Any sharp theory-practice divide is thus as much a chimera at 
the non-J.D. level as it is at the J.D. level. 
44 METAPHORS WE LIVE BY, supra note 16, at 5. Similarly, Lanham includes the 
following as one of his definitions of “metaphor”: [A]ssertion of identity rather than, as 
with Simile, likeness.” RICHARD A. LANHAM, A HANDLIST OF RHETORICAL TERMS 100 (2d 
ed. 1991). The critical point here is that metaphor says that something is what it is not.  
For example, Lakoff explores the different conceptual implications of the metaphor 
“argument is war” as opposed to the metaphor “argument is a dance.” METAPHORS WE 
LIVE BY, supra note 16, at 4-5. A lawyer who takes the former view of “argument” will 
likely have a quite different practice from a lawyer who takes the latter view.  For the 
distinction between metaphor and metonymy (i.e., the use “of one entity to refer to 
another that is related to it” such as when a server refers to a customer as “the ham 
sandwich” because of what he ordered), see id at 35-40.  
45 Robert J. Rovetto, The Shape of Shapes: An Ontological Exploration, 1 http://ceur-
ws.org/Vol-812/paper9.pdf (last visited July 30, 2013) (explaining the difference between 
geometric and physical shapes).  
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simple do not actually exist in nature itself.
46
 Because concepts such as Greenacre 
metaphorically characterize something else in terms of that concept, our “ordinary 
conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally 
metaphorical in nature.”47  It is the humanities that teach us the critically important ability 
to recognize and handle metaphors.  
Furthermore, legal categories themselves are metaphors. Categories are “sets of 
things”  “treated as if they were, for the purposes at hand, similar or equivalent or 
somehow substitutable for each other,”48 Categories are thus metaphors because they 
treat things as if they were other things.
49
  Lawyers (and all other thinkers) use such 
categories to organize experience in ways that make such experience easier to handle.
50
  
By categorizing experiences together, lawyers do not have to debate every new 
experience but can treat “similar” experiences in ways they have already decided.   
Since even “natural” itself is a conceptual term depending upon how we define 
nature, there are no natural categories apart from our definitional systems.
51
  Categories, 
in other words, come from us and not from some other world in itself.
52
 Of course, for 
these categories to be good ones, they must work “well enough for [the user] to 
function.”53To the extent we need to create and debate legal categories, a larger stock of 
philosophical, literary, historical, and other knowledge will provide a richer source of 
                                                 
46 See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 27-28 (2002) 
[hereinafter AMSTERDAM & BRUNER]. 
47
 METAPHORS WE LIVE BY, supra note 16, at 3.  
48
 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 46, at 20 
49
 See supra note 48. 
50
 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 46 at 21-26.  
51
 See id., at 50.  
52
 See id. at 27.  
53
 PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 19, at 21.  
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potential metaphors.
54
  A good legal education therefore requires good knowledge of the 
liberal arts and humanities.
55
 
Third, we must re-think the form of the good, post-divide law school course book.  
Good course books are not case centered unless the subject itself is case centered and 
cannot be presented in a more thorough and efficient manner.
 56
 Good course books 
provide explanations of the law comparable to the quality and level of hornbooks, 
especially given the importance of legal categorization. Good course books (or their 
supplements) contain the primary public and private materials needed to acquire 
reasonable student-level affordance knowledge of the subject.
57
 Good course books 
contain good problem sets for each day of class. Students can answer questions in IRAC 
form,
58
 can discuss them in class, and can otherwise be evaluated regularly on their 
answers. And good course books should have a shelf-life well beyond the course; they 
should be books the student would wish to keep for continued use. 
                                                 
54
 Categories also come in large part from stories, theories, and religion or other 
normative sources. See id. at 29-32.  
55
 The humanities are “those branches of knowledge, such as literature and art, that are 
concerned with human thought and culture.” Humanities, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
COLLEGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2007). 
56
 Constitutional law quickly comes to mind as one qualifying example.  The Supreme 
Court’s Constitutional cases as a practical matter vie at any given point in time with the 
text of the Constitution itself.   The texts of Constitutional cases can therefore require the 
same careful parsing as the text of the Constitution itself.  
57
 For example, a good course book on contracts (either in itself or in a supplement) 
includes relevant statutes (such as relevant portions of the Uniform Commercial Code) as 
well actual contracts to begin teaching both the embodied meaning and affordance 
knowledge of contract law. 
58
 This requires the student to spot the issue(s), identify the rule(s), apply the rule(s), and 
reach a conclusion—in other words it requires them to put their thoughts in the form of a 
good thought.  
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Fourth and finally, we must re-think faculty hiring standards. Since practice 
cannot be separated from theory, a well-rounded legal scholar needs significant practice 
experience.
59
 In the words of Jerome Frank,  
Who would learn golf from a golf instructor, contenting himself with sitting in the 
locker-room analyzing newspaper accounts of important golf-matches that had 
been played by someone else several years before? Why should law professors be 
like Tomlinson? “This I have read in a book” he said, “and this was told to me, 
and this I have thought that another man thought of a Prince in Muscovy.”60 
   
Of course, we should not throw out the baby with the bathwater. Not all faculty 
members must meet this standard.  A historian, philosopher, or linguist, for example, 
might well bring humanities skills of great benefit to a law school.
61
 But a person lacking 
substantial practice experience who is hired solely to teach purely-legal courses does not 
fit within the mold of such an exception.  
 
                                                 
59
 It is hard to see how “significant practice experience” can mean less than three years of 
solid practice experience. Almost half of the law firms in one recent survey have had 
clients who have refused to pay for time billed by associates with fewer than three years 
of experience. David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business/after-law-school-
associates-learn-to-be-lawyers.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2& (noting that a recent 
American Lawyer survey “found that 47 percent of law firms had a client say, in effect, 
‘We don’t want to see the names of first- or second-year associates on our bills.’”).  Why 
should law students paying for a legal education expect less experience than clients 
paying for legal services?  For reasons previously given, I would set the minimum bar at 
five to ten years of significant practice experience.  See Harold Anthony Lloyd, 
Exercising Common Sense, Exorcising Langdell: The Inseparability of Legal Theory, 
Practice and the Humanities, 49WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1242 (2014). 
60
 Frank, supra note 1, at 1311-1312. The reference is to Kipling’s poem “Tomlinson.”  
See RUDYARD KIPLING, BALLADS AND BARRACK-ROOM BALLADS 129 (1895).  For a 
chilling actual example of Frank’s point at both the national and international levels, see 
Lawrence Rosenthal, Those Who Can, Teach: What the Legal Career of John Yoo Tells 
Us About Who Should Be Teaching Law, 80 MISS. L.J. 1563 (discussing the incompetent 
analysis of a legal “scholar” in the Bush torture memos). 
61
 Ironically, there appears to be a view among at least some potential law professor 
candidates that “the further away you get from the humanities the better.” Id.  
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III. CONCLUSION 
 Having debunked the illusory theory-practice divide, I would stress in closing that 
good lawyers and good law students seek good affordance knowledge as well as a good 
liberal education.  More precisely, they understand that good legal education, good 
affordance knowledge, and a good liberal education are in fact inseparable.  Good 
lawyers and law students do not seek the impossible void of theory divorced from 
practice any more than they seek the impossible gibberish of practice without theory.  To 
paraphrase Kant again, they understand that theory without practice is empty while 
practice without theory is blind.
62
 They also therefore understand that any approach 
purporting to elevate theory over practice (or the reverse, should that ever occur) has no 
place in legal education.  
For those worried about the prestige of law school compared to other graduate 
schools,
63
 embracing reform does not taint prestige.  In fact, it does just the opposite. It 
elevates law schools academically.   Again, as discussed above, practice cannot sensibly 
be severed from theory since theory cannot sensibly be severed from experience. A law 
school eschewing any attempt at such severance is thus by definition more academically 
rigorous than a law school which purports to do the reverse.  Additionally, just as 
winning at the game of chess involves vaster intellectual prowess than merely 
memorizing the rules of chess and how others have played the game, successful law 
practice involves vaster intellectual prowess than reading cases and applying them to 
hypotheticals.  Finally, because schools also teaching practice knowledge teach more 
                                                 
62
 See supra, note 18.  
63
 Spiegel, supra note 2, at 610 n.13.  
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than schools which purport not to teach such knowledge, by definition the former are 
more demanding than the latter.  Where is the shame in that? 
To be clear, law schools cannot turn out fully-practice-ready graduates in only 
three years. Practice-ready graduates would have to be competent attorneys from day one.  
If competency in the professional sphere is “the ability to perform the activities within an 
occupation or function to the standards expected in employment,” 64 no one can 
reasonably contend that a graduate who has never practiced before can meet the standards 
expected of a practicing attorney.  A three-year law school should impart an excellent 
familiarity with the core of what lawyers actually do, but this goal should not be confused 
with competence
65
 or therefore with proficiency or expertise.
66
   
Not only can law firms therefore have no reasonable expectation of fully-practice-
ready graduates straight out of law school,
67
 they, too, must play their instructional part. 
Law firms and individual members of the bar should embrace their moral and practical 
obligation to mentor and train new law graduates. Not only is helping others morally 
right, it is in the practical interests of the practicing bar for new members to make the bar 
                                                 
64
 MICHAEL ERAUT, DEVELOPING PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND COMPETENCE 187 
(1994). Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss in detail the various 
definitions of skills acquisition levels, Eraut discusses, among others, the common 
“Dreyfus Model of Skills Acquisition” which includes five levels: novice, advanced 
beginner, competent, proficient, and expert. Id.at 124. 
65
 Id. at 187.  
66
 Id. at 124.  A detailed discussion of core “familiarities” that good law schools should 
impart is beyond the scope of this chapter. For a sampling of such proposed core 
lawyering skills and knowledge, see, e.g., ROBERT MACCRATE ET AL., REPORT OF THE 
TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 138-141 
(ABA 1992) (outlining “Fundamental Lawyering Skills” and “Fundamental Values of the 
Profession”). 
67
 See Nancy B. Rapoport, Changing the Modal Law School: Rethinking U.S. Legal 
Education in (Most) Schools, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1119 (2012) (noting that “most 
senior lawyers bemoan the ability of recent law graduates to ‘hit the ground running.’”). 
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better and not to make it worse.
68
  Thus, doctrine and skills, practice and theory, merge 
yet again. 
                                                 
68
 Bar mentoring programs, for example, recognize this duty. See, e.g., State Bar Lawyer 
Mentoring Program, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,  
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/professionalis
m/mentoring.html (last visited July 25, 2013).  
